A hedge fund manager's bang-the-close trades in platinum futures provides a natural experiment for investigating the response of financial intermediaries (floor traders) to suspected manipulative trades. We show that the fund manager's trades generated artificially high settlement prices, and that the price impact of these trades exceeded those predicted by various competitive benchmarks designed to account for their immediacy and exceptionally large size. We consider this empirical evidence in light of theoretical models that predict tacit collusion (implicit cooperation) can arise in trading environments with a small number of participants engaged in long-term repeated interactions.
Introduction
How do market participants dynamically respond to a single instigator's repetitive, long-term attempts at market manipulation? Do financial intermediaries act to mitigate, facilitate, or magnify the effect of the manipulation? To what extent is tacit collusion possible in an environment with repeated interaction of a small number of participants? The answers to these questions have important implications for optimal market design, market surveillance, and litigation settlement. We provide new insights into these topics by studying the response of financial intermediaries to a well-documented case of alleged commodities futures manipulation. We also develop insight into how manipulative schemes can persist, particularly in the context of the recent evidence of collusive manipulation of the LIBOR rate fixing and allegations of other manipulations of important exchange rate and commodity price benchmarks.
In this study, we examine whether financial intermediaries mitigated, facilitated, or magnified an alleged manipulative scheme initiated by a customer. Regulatory enforcement actions and our own empirical evidence suggest that a hedge fund portfolio manager (the customer) directed unusually large market-on-close (MOC) orders to the New York Mercantile Exchange's (NYMEX) platinum futures trading floor to "bang the close." 1 These MOC orders had the apparent aim and effect of inflating daily contract settlement prices throughout an extended period beginning in November 2007 and ending in May
2008
. 2 We study the response of floor traders (the financial intermediaries) filling the customer's orders on these bang-the-close trades. At this time, the bulk of futures trading volume had migrated to an electronic trading platform. Nevertheless, floor trades still accounted for about 20% of total NYMEX volume in platinum futures contracts. By rule, both exchange floor and electronic limit order book trades during the closing two minutes of trading were averaged to calculate that day's contract settlement price.
During this alleged manipulation episode, the portfolio manager (PM) routinely submitted exceptionally large buy orders on the (less liquid) floor just seconds before the end of the closing settlement period. We use the PM's alleged attempt to manipulate official daily platinum contract settlement prices as a natural experiment within which to examine whether financial intermediaries reduce or reinforce the price impact of these alleged manipulative trades.
This episode qualifies as a well-specified natural experiment for our purposes for three reasons.
First, an ongoing class action lawsuit provides us with detailed publicly available data on the actual trades executed by the PM, as well as his private communications with floor brokers. 3 These data permit the precise identification of the dates and times of bang-the-close trades necessary to compare market outcomes on days with and without the PM's alleged manipulative trading. Second, the specific trades of this PM are likely to be non-informative regarding commodity fundamentals. Moreover, the PM focused his trading on the floor, rather than seeking potentially more competitive prices on the electronic trading platform; this behavior limited outside competition for his order flow from participants other than the floor traders. Third, the side-by-side electronic trading platform provides natural pricing benchmarks to assess whether floor traders executed these bang-the-close trades at competitive prices. Note that our main research interest is not in the PM, who serves here as a customer, but in the behavior of the floor traders, who serve as financial intermediaries. Indeed, our analysis does not require us to understand the motives for the PM's trades. In some sense, whether the PM's large MOC orders were the work of a fool The open outcry exchange floor has been traditionally viewed as a model competitive trading environment for futures contracts, well suited for both price discovery and order execution. Thus, given that this bang-the-close trading episode lasted for seven months, it seems reasonable to expect that sharp floor traders would detect the pattern of these repetitive MOC orders and infer that they contained little or no new information. Consequently, one would expect the floor traders to price the end-of-day trades competitively according to the expected costs of unwinding them.
We find evidence that the floor traders consistently executed these MOC platinum trades at prices significantly higher than our competitive price benchmarks. Furthermore, we find that the platinum floor traders executed the PM's buy orders at increasingly noncompetitive prices, from an average of 15-40 ticks above benchmarks in the first half of the alleged manipulation period to an average of 50-100 ticks above benchmarks in the second half of the alleged manipulation period. Moreover, during the alleged manipulation period, an ex post simulated trading exercise suggests that floor traders may have reaped excessive profits of more than $2.5 million over 95 days with minimal measureable risk. Thus, we provide evidence that even open outcry floor trading can lead to noncompetitive pricing generating quantitatively important outcomes.
While alternative explanations for these price patterns may exist, we cannot rule out the existence of tacit collusion among the floor traders. Tacit collusion refers to coordination without direct communication. It is a process by which agents recognize their shared, interdependent economic interests and, in response, set prices at profit-maximizing, supra-competitive levels. Pirrong (1996) suggests that repeated interactions among floor traders in a setting where the activities of all parties can be observed make an open outcry system conducive to collusive behavior. For instance, floor traders might jointly raise their offers to the disadvantage of a customer who needs to buy a large number of contracts within a short period of time. Pirrong conjectures that incentives for individual traders to deviate from the collusive equilibrium as well as outside competition from non-floor traders limit any collusive profits of floor traders to perhaps one to two ticks.
The noncompetitive pricing distortions we find during the alleged bang-the-close manipulation episode in the fragmented platinum futures market are orders of magnitude larger than those conjectured by Pirrong (1996) for a typical open outcry market. The net effect of the prices offered by the platinum floor traders reinforced the desired impact of the customer's alleged manipulative trades. Thus, noncompetitive prices cannot only persist, but may also be reinforced, where the market maker environment consists of a small number of participants who repeatedly interact.
Background
Platinum futures contracts are listed by, and subject to, the rules and regulations of NYMEX.
Though acquired by CME Group in August 2008, NYMEX remains a separate self-regulatory organization. A platinum futures contract calls for delivery of 50 troy ounces that is at least 99.95 percent pure. 4 Prices are quoted in U.S. dollars and cents per troy ounce with a minimum price fluctuation ("tick size") of $0.10 per troy ounce. Trading terminates on the third last business day of the delivery month.
NYMEX lists contracts for a quarterly cycle of January, April, July, and October, but also fills out the trading menu with contracts for the current and next two calendar months.
Open outcry trading of platinum futures takes place on a NYMEX trading floor in New York for a session beginning at 8:20 a.m. and ending at 1:05 p.m. (all times are Eastern). Electronic trading takes place via the CME Globex and CME ClearPort platforms for a near 24-hour session beginning at 6:00 
Noncompetitive Prices in Financial Markets
Recent investigations have alleged that certain money market traders working for major banks colluded to set daily LIBOR fixings at artificial levels in order to profit from positions in related derivative contracts (Financial Services Authority, 2012) . The LIBOR collusion case shows that tacit cooperative agreements can survive in groups whose members interact repeatedly over time while observing each other's behavior. 7 In an earlier example, dealers engaged in an infinitely repeated game with complete and perfect information, in which the current and historical quotes were available to all dealers. The game theory "folk theorem" shows that, under such conditions, collusion may be a possible equilibrium outcome if the future costs to each player of deserting the equilibrium exceed the immediate gains (Friedman, 1971) . Similar conditions appear to characterize the LIBOR fixing process, as well as many other important financial markets. Dutta and Madhavan (1997) argue that implicit collusion can arise even from non-cooperative behavior among dealers, but that institutional arrangements such as order flow direction by brokers to their preferred dealers as well as price matching agreements are important in sustaining higher-than-competitive bid-ask spreads. In the context of uniform-price auctions for Treasury securities, Back and Zender (1993) show that collusive strategies can be self-reinforcing. Pirrong (1996) points out that tacit collusion may also emerge among futures floor traders since these traders interact in a transparent setting on a daily basis over a long period of time. Thus, floor traders as a group can punish any individuals who defect from the cooperative agreement by refusing to trade with them, or by only offering business on unfavorable terms. In contrast, those who cooperate can be rewarded. Pirrong (1996) posits that two forces limit the impacts of such collusive behavior in futures markets. First, the gains from any one trader's defection from the tacit cooperative agreement may exceed the costs of punishment if price distortions become too large. Second, competition from off the floor ("upstairs") traders submitting limit orders disciplines the degree by which collusive floor traders can move prices through cooperation. In the case of NYMEX metals contracts, the Globex trading platform should resolve this potential collusion by opening the system to client limit orders to the extent that floor and electronic order flows are fully integrated. Such outside competition fits the Pirrong conjecture why even collusive floor prices should be kept close to competitive prices. Markham (1991) Ni et al. (2005) explore whether closing stock prices may be manipulated on option expiration dates. Kumar and Seppi (1992) consider the manipulation of settlement prices for futures contracts that are cash settled. Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2011) attempt to measure the quantitative impact of known instances of closing price manipulation in equity markets.
Details of the Alleged Manipulation of Platinum Futures Settlement Prices 10
During the period between November 2007 and May 2008, a portfolio manager working for a major hedge fund is alleged to have engaged in closing price manipulation of the platinum NYMEX futures contracts. 11 The PM placed large market buy orders on the floor just seconds before the end of the closing period. By using such MOC orders, the portfolio manager placed no apparent limit on how high a 9 Bernhardt and Davies (2009) develop a theoretical model of end-of-quarter "painting the tape" by mutual funds. 10 The PM is alleged to have also manipulated the palladium futures market. We focus only on his trades in platinum futures.
11 Another well-known case of alleged manipulation of futures markets using "bang-the-close" trades involves Optiver Holding BV. The CFTC accused Optiver Holding, two of its subsidiaries, and three employees with manipulation and attempted manipulation of crude oil, heating oil, and gasoline futures on the NYMEX. The traders are alleged to have used "bang-the-close" trades in at least 19 instances during March 2007 to manipulate the settlement prices of the oil futures contracts. See: http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfoptiveruscomplaint072 408.pdf price he would pay to buy large numbers of contracts during a short window of time in an illiquid market.
Moreover, he ignored the obvious alternative of "walking the book" of limit orders concurrently available on the more liquid Globex platform.
We do not fully analyze the motives behind the PM's bang-the-close trades. Clearly, artificially high settlement prices benefitted the daily marked-to-market cash flows on the PM's existing long platinum contract positions. But the benefits of such marked-to-market cash flows would only be transitory unless bang-the-close price impacts persist. Private communications with his brokers suggest that, on particular days, one aim was to push prices through certain technical targets ("new highs"), perhaps with the goal of inducing follow-on trading by momentum investors.
An MOC order is an order to buy or sell at the end of the trading session during the two-minute 
Settlement Price Artificiality
Traditional microstructure models decompose bid-ask spreads, and by extension, the price impact of trades, into three components: (i) order processing costs; (ii) inventory holding costs; and (iii) adverse selection. 13 We believe that the adverse selection component of the PM's trades is likely to have declined over time, as other floor traders became aware of the repeated nature of the bang-the-close trades and the apparent lack of new fundamental information behind these trades. Therefore, we expect that the price impact of the PM trades in a competitive market should be driven primarily by the order processing and inventory holding costs associated with trades of a given size and given market conditions.
To control for these costs, we construct competitive price benchmarks that reflect the size of each of the PM's trades and the corresponding market conditions. We then compare the actual execution prices of the PM's trades to two alternative benchmark competitive prices: 1) the average price that would be achieved by a market order of the same size if it were executed immediately against the depth available on the Globex limit order book, and 2) an estimate of the average price at which the PM's floor trader counterparty could unwind the new position on Globex after the floor's close. Our constructed benchmarks are tied tightly to the specific conditions applicable to competitive pricing in the platinum futures markets. This approach is more precisely targeted than the general screening approach for collusion of Bajari (2009, 2012) .
The PM bypassed the Globex platform when he chose to execute his bang-the-close trades via the exchange floor. We use the prices from concurrent closing-period trades on the Globex platform to discern market conditions absent the PM's activity. Specifically, we define a Counterfactual Settlement
Price as the VWAP of Globex trades during the closing period. We then use the official daily Settlement Price to define Settlement Price Artificiality as
Assuming that, aside from the PM's bang-the-close trades, floor trades were priced competitively, we can interpret Settlement Price Artificiality as driven by the difference in average execution prices for the PM and the VWAP on closing-period Globex trades, so that
where  PM represents the volume of contracts traded by the PM on the floor during the closing period expressed as a fraction of total volume traded (floor plus Globex) during the closing period (i.e.,
Trade Price Inflation due to the PM's Choice of Order Structure ("Size and Immediacy")
We distinguish between the expected direct price impact of the PM's trades based on the characteristics of his trades and any indirect impact of these trades, which we interpret as excess mark-ups that possibly reflect noncompetitive practices by floor trader counterparties. The PM's direct impact is a 
Data
From CME DataMine, we obtained exchange data for all NYMEX platinum futures contract trades during the period from July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008. These data include the official record of trade times and prices, but only include trade quantities for the Globex trades. We also obtain all of the tick-bytick, time-stamped-to-the-millisecond CME Group Market Data messages needed to recreate the 5-quotedeep GLOBEX limit order book. We also obtained daily settlement prices for platinum futures from Bloomberg Financial.
We obtained the PM's bang-the-close trade data from public court records. 14 We define the alleged manipulation period as beginning with the PM's first reported bang-the-close trade on November samples: the first 47 days ("first half") and the next 48 days ("second half"). The second half of the alleged manipulation period begins on February 13. median Settlement Price Artificiality is $4.81 (versus $1.31) for trades of 25 to 50 contracts and $8.30 16 We presume the court records to be reliable. But one potential explanation of this result would be that the court records do not capture a few of the PM's trades from the pre-class period. Alternatively, we cannot rule out the possibility that other traders might be engaging in bang-the-close trades in this earlier period. We note that, in the context of equity markets, Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2009) argue that many instances of closing price manipulation are undetected by authorities.
Empirical Analysis of Price Manipulation and Noncompetitive Prices

The PM's Trades
(versus $2.95) for trades of 75 or 100 contracts. The P-values presented in bottom row offer strong evidence against the null hypothesis that the mean (or median) Settlement Price Artificiality is the same in each half of the alleged manipulation period.
Bang-the-Close PM Trade Prices
Figures 6a and 6b depict market conditions and trading activity in platinum futures contracts on both Globex and the exchange floor for 15 minutes before and 15 minutes after around the floor's 1:05 PM EST close for two specific days. We believe that our Size and Immediacy Mark-up estimates represent conservative benchmarks because they do not account for possible interaction of a large order with new (or hidden) limit orders.
Trade Price Inflation due to the PM's Choice of Order Structure ("Size and Immediacy")
Our walk-the-book benchmark does not capture the dynamic nature of the limit book in response to order flow as analyzed in Parlour (1998), Hollifield et al. (2004) , Foucault et al. (2005) , and Rosu (2009).
Sandas (2001) finds that "limit order books offer too little depth or imply price schedules that are too steep relative to the order book changes in response to trades." In a competitive environment with adverse selection costs, market makers may find it unprofitable to submit limit orders further away from the inside quote given their lower probability of execution. But, as market orders arrive and the limit order book shifts, these potential orders have a higher probability of execution and, as such, are submitted in response. As such, our walk-the-book benchmark constructed using only posted liquidity likely overestimates the price impact of large walk-the-book orders because it underestimates actual liquidity. half of the alleged manipulation period. We present results for walk-the-book prices calculated three different ways. The "Actual" method uses the observed walk-the-book price for the PM's actual order size for a given day. However, the sample size for 75-and 100-contract trades using actual data is small (just five first-half observations and four second-half observations) since these walk-the-book quote sizes are infrequently observed. To broaden our sample, we use two additional calculation methods for the 75-and 100-contract trades. The "Actual 50-contract + .40" method simply adds a constant $0.40 to the contemporaneously observed walk-the-book price for a 50-contract order to match against any 75-lot or 100-lot PM trade day (the $0.40 value is based on our results in table 2). In contrast, the "Slope Extrapolation" method estimates the 75-contract walk-the-book price by adding the difference between the actual 50-contract and 25-contract prices to the actual 50-contract walk-the-book price. The "Slope Extrapolation" method estimates the 100-contract walk-the-book price by adding twice the difference between the actual 50-contract and 25-contract prices to the actual 50-contract walk-the-book price. Pvalues for tests of the null hypothesis that the respective sample's mean or median Excess Mark-Up equals zero are presented in parentheses.
PM Trade Price Inflation Using a Pre-Event Benchmark ("Excess Mark-Up")
Over the first half of the alleged manipulation period, we find no evidence that the mean or 
PM Trade Price Inflation Using a Post-Event Benchmark ("Excess
In a competitive market, floor traders seeing the PM's MOC order to buy, say, 50 contracts, should respond with offerings based upon their perception of prices they will have to pay to offset these positions after the floor's close. Under the assumption of perfect competition by risk-neutral floor traders, the PM would be able to trade at a price equal to the expected cost of unwinding the 50-lot position after the close. Thus, we interpret Excess Mark-Up ex post as an excess profitability measure that provides another index of noncompetitive floor trade prices. Table 4 The results in Table 4 provide strong evidence that the prices for the trades that filled the PM's MOC orders did not reflect competitive conditions. In the first half of the alleged manipulation period, 
Observations and qualifications
We find strong evidence that the PM's alleged manipulative trades were executed at noncompetitive prices and that the magnitude of the mispricing was larger in the second half of the alleged manipulation period. We offer the following qualifications of these results. First, our price benchmarks derived from the CME data may contain errors in measurement due to problems in the original trade reporting.
Second, Figure portion of the excess floor trader profits we measure. We observe no evidence that these limit orders were submitted, and if these orders were submitted, they do not appear to have had the opportunity to interact with the portfolio manager's orders. Apparently, the fragmentation of order flow across the two alternative trading channels was extreme. Kumar and Seppi (1994) and Cheng et al. (2005) 
Conclusion
We hold that a truly competitive market should protect a fool and otherwise neutralize a knave.
As such, regardless of the true motives of the hedge fund portfolio manager, we believe that competition among market participants should have resulted in the price impact of his repetitive bang-the-close trades being consistent with their predictable arrival and low information content. Our focus here has been the response of the floor traders, acting as financial intermediaries, to the portfolio manager's order flow. We find that the financial intermediaries do not always set prices in a manner to reduce the impact of a single customer's large bang-the-close futures contract trades, and in fact, by their actions, may increase this impact. We show that the price impact of such bang-the-close futures contract trades increased over time, contrary to the predictions of a competitive market environment. During the second half of the alleged manipulation period, floor traders executed the portfolio manager's platinum futures contract buy orders at prices that were 80 to 120 ticks above competitive benchmarks. This impact is much larger than that conjectured by Pirrong (1996) as possible for collusion among traders in a typical open outcry market.
For the case of platinum, these noncompetitive prices persisted in an open outcry setting characterized by a small number of traders, intermittent supervision by compliance officers, and order flow from outside participants fragmented by the Globex platform alternative. We note that, after this alleged manipulation incident, the NYMEX removed closing period floor trades from settlement pricing formulas. Not long after this change, floor trading in platinum effectively disappeared.
While our empirical analysis has focused on trading in a specific market over a particular time period, our results have more general implications for regulators and market venues. Our results show that even trades conducted by a single customer can trigger price impacts that are larger and more persistent than standard competitive market models would predict. Our evidence is consistent with theoretical models predicting that tacit collusion among financial intermediaries may arise in a setting with frequent, repeated interaction among a small number of similar participants in a transparent market for a homogenous product. The Excess Mark-Up based upon an average unwind price is defined as the difference between the VWAP of the PM's bang-the-close trades and the VWAP for hypothetical post-close unwinding trades for a position of matching size on Globex. This table presents estimated mean and median values of Excess Mark-Up for two trade size groupings (25 or 50 contracts; 75 or 100 contracts) during the first and second halves of the alleged manipulation period. We present results for two alternative unwind trade scenarios. The first assumes that floor traders account for 100% of all observed post-close buyer-initiated trading activity on days that the PM trades beginning immediately after the close and continuing until the position size sold to the PM is unwound. The second assumes that floor traders account for only 50% of all observed post-close buyer-initiated trading activity on days that the PM trades beginning immediately after the close and continuing until the position size sold to the PM is unwound. P-values for tests of the null hypothesis that the respective sample's mean or median Excess Mark-Up equals zero are presented in parentheses. The P-values presented in the bottom row are for tests of null hypothesis that the means (or medians) of Excess Mark-Up in each half of the alleged manipulation period are equal. All numbers are in $thousands. The pro-forma profits are calculated assuming that a hypothetical floor trader executed the PM's bang-the-close trades and unwound the acquired short positions through offsetting purchases of contracts beginning immediately after the close on Globex using 100% or 50% of the actual sequence of observed buyer-initiated trades.
